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PRECAP; Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State: Feeling
the Effects of Medical Marijuana on Montana’s Rational Basis Test
Luc Brodhead
No. DA 15-0055 Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
What is the scope and proper application of rational basis review
in Montana?
Does the Montana Marijuana Act’s (MMA) commercial
prohibition on marijuana providers (limiting them to 3 patients and
prohibiting any sale of marijuana) satisfy rational basis review?
Does the MMA’s 25 patient physician review trigger (an
automatic review of the standards of any doctor who certifies more than
24 patients per year) satisfy rational basis review?
Does the MMA’s provider advertising ban unconstitutionally
infringe on protected free speech?
Does the blanket ban on probationer access to medical marijuana
satisfy rational basis review?
Does the warrantless provider search provision (permitting state
inspectors to enter and inspect provider premises) infringe on right to
privacy?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, the Montana Legislature passed the MMA, a more
tightly regulated version of the prior medical marijuana law.1 The
Legislature passed the MMA in response to a rapid increase in
cardholders (patients approved for medical marijuana consumption) and
marijuana providers.2 The Legislature was specifically concerned with
evidence of various abuses under the prior version the law, including
issues such as the diversion of medical marijuana to non cardholders, the
low threshold for getting cardholder status under the “chronic pain”
category, and widespread advertising by providers.3
Soon after the passage of the MMA, the Montana Cannabis
Industry Association (MCIA) and other plaintiffs sued in Lewis and
Br. of Appellant at 3–6, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont. May 6, 2015) (DA 15-0055).
Id. at 4.
3
Id. at 4–5.
1
2
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Clark County District Court to enjoin various provisions of the new act.4
The district court preliminarily enjoined several of the provisions such as
the ban on commercial sale of medical marijuana, the ban on caregiver
advertising, the warrantless caregiver inspections, and the 25 patient
physician review trigger.5 The court reasoned that those provisions
implicated the plaintiff’s fundamental constitutional rights, triggering
strict scrutiny analysis.6 The state appealed the injunction on the
commercial ban, arguing that the district court erred in applying strict
scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to the provisions.7
In 2012, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the
commercial ban did not implicate the fundamental rights to employment,
to health, or to privacy, and that the plaintiffs had no fundamental right
to medical marijuana.8 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded
the case to the district court to apply rational basis review to the
commercial ban.9
In 2015, the district court applied rational basis review to the
commercial ban and the 25 patient physician review trigger, finding them
irrational even under the less demanding test.10 The court concluded on
summary judgment that the MCIA, challenging the commercial ban on
the basis of denial of equal protection, had met its burden of showing that
the provision created different classes of cardholders and imposed
different burdens upon them.11 The court further concluded that the State
failed to meet its burden of justifying the distinction with a rationally
related objective,12 rejecting the State’s arguments that marijuana
remains illegal under federal law13 and that the ban was necessary to
prevent the abuses cited by the Legislature in 2011.14 The court took a
similar stance on the 25 patient physician review trigger, finding that the
state failed to show any rational justification for the provision in light of
the fact that abuses by physicians had already receded under the enjoined
version of the MMA.15 Accordingly, the court entered a permanent
injunction on both provisions.16
In the same decision, the district court enjoined the prohibition
on advertising by marijuana providers on First Amendment grounds, an
Id. at 2.
Thomas J. Bourguignon, Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana and the
Constitutionality of Medical Marijuana, 75 MONT. L. REV. 167, 174 (2009).
6
Br. of Appellant at 2.
7
Id.
8
Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1166, 1168 (Mont. 2012).
9
Id. at 1168.
10
Appellee’s Response Br. at 2, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont. July 2, 2015) (DA 150055).
11
Order on Mot. for Summ. J. 19:5–7, Jan. 2, 2015 [DDV-2011-518].
12
Id. at 19:8–9.
13
Id. at 20:1–7.
14
Id. at 2:18–23.
15
Id. at 15:1–11.
16
Id. at 15:12–13, 21:19.
4
5
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issue that the Montana Supreme Court had not previously addressed.17
The court found that the provision made content-based distinctions on
protected political and educational speech and found that the provision
failed under strict scrutiny.18 The court took issue with the vagueness and
overbreadth of the provision, finding it “to be meaningless as to what it
prohibits.”19
Lastly, the district court declined to enjoin the warrantless
provider search provision and the ban on access by probationers.20 As to
the warrantless searches, the court adopted the State’s argument that
“regulatory inspections of closely regulated industries can constitute an
exception to the search warrant requirement,”21 finding that medical
marijuana was clearly a “closely regulated activity.”22 As to the
probationer restriction, the court agreed with the state’s rational
justification that the Department of Corrections should have discretion to
limit the rights of people under its supervision,23 but asserted that the
restriction should only apply on a case-by-case basis, when a reasonable
nexus exists between the restriction and the person’s underlying
offense.24
Shortly thereafter, the State appealed the injunctions on the
commercial ban, the 25 patient physician review trigger, and the
advertising ban.25 MCIA cross-appealed the district court’s failure to
enjoin the warrantless search provision and the blanket ban on
probationer use.26
III. ARGUMENT
A. The scope and proper application of rational basis review in
Montana.
Since the Montana Supreme Court required rational basis review
of the commercial prohibition in 2012, these parties have disagreed over
its extent and proper application, focusing on two main questions:
whether the burden of proof shifts from the challenger of a statute to the
State; and, the extent to which evidence is required in rational basis
review and the proper use and scope of that evidence.27 In the order now
under appeal, the district court substantially adopted and applied MCIA’s
Id. at 9:9–15, 12:8.
Id. at 11:10–14.
19
Id. at 10:21–11:4.
20
Id. at 14:7, 22:23.
21
Id. at 12:24–25.
22
Id. at 13:5–6.
23
Id. at 22:10–15.
24
Id. at 22:16–19.
25
Br. of Appellant at 1.
26
Appellee’s Response Br. at 1.
27
Br. of Appellant at 13, 22–23; Appellee’s Response Br. at 18–20.
17
18
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view of the rational basis test.28 The Montana Supreme Court’s decision
on some of the questions presented here will likely depend on whose
version of the test it applies.
1. Arguments
The State argues that under rational basis review the burden
remains on the challenger, “to show the law is not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest,” or in other words, “to negate every
conceivable basis which might support it.”29 The State further argues that
even if it does bear a burden, it need not meet that burden with current
empirical proof of the law’s effectiveness.30 Rather, the State must only
present evidence of the Legislature’s unsubstantiated “rational
speculation” as to a law’s justification.31 The State takes this one step
further by asserting that evidence of the current state of the law should
not influence the analysis because that amounts to a judicial
determination of the law’s current necessity (i.e. its “wisdom or
expediency”), not whether the Legislature had a rational basis for making
the law at the time it was made.32
MCIA argues that under rational basis review, an equal rights
challenger has the initial burden of demonstrating that the law treats “two
similarly situated classes of individuals differently.”33 Therefore, MCIA
argues, “once a challenger meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts
to the government to justify the classification.”34 MCIA further asserts
that the district court correctly supported its findings with evidence of the
current circumstances of the law.35 MCIA reasons that such evidence
sheds light on whether the legislative concerns that motivated the
making of a law still apply today.36
2. Analysis
The Court will likely address this issue at oral argument, either
as a stand-alone question or in the context of specific provisions. Either
way, the Court will want to hear from the parties on the question of
burden shifting and the question of whether the use of current
circumstances evidence is necessary or even permissible in rational basis
review.
Order Mot. Summ. J. 15:1–11, 17:1–18, 20:8–21:7.
Br. of Appellant at 13.
Id. at 23.
31
Id. at 23
32
Id. at 22
33
Appellee’s Response Br. at 13.
34
Id. at 19.
35
Id. at 10.
36
Id. at 11.
28
29
30
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The State’s position that they bear no burden under rational basis
review will face an uphill battle. MCIA can point to numerous cases that
indicate a positive burden on the State to show that the challenged law
has a legitimate objective and to rationally connect that objective to the
law’s classification.37 Therefore, the State will have to convince the
Court to overrule its own precedent in order to adopt its approach. While
the State has some federal authority in support of its position, MCIA will
likely insist that the Montana Constitution offers a greater level of
protection to individuals than 14th amendment, making the federal
precedent less persuasive.
In contrast, it is unclear how the Court will address the position
that rational basis review permits, and even requires, consideration of
evidence of a law’s current circumstances. On one hand, MCIA makes a
compelling argument that in determining the rationality of a law, a court
should consider the actual effect that the law has towards the
government’s objective. The idea that a court should simply ignore
evidence that a law is not achieving its objective seems to place those
people negatively affected by the law at an unnecessary risk. On the
other hand, the State makes a strong argument that it is not the Court’s
job to fix an ineffectual law. Rather, it is the Legislature’s job. The Court
may ultimately be swayed by the State’s argument that rational basis
“constitutes the ‘paradigm of judicial restraint,”38 meaning that while a
law may be clearly ineffective, courts must concentrate only on ensuring
that, at the time it was made, the Legislature had some articulable reason
for making it in a way that treats people unequally.
B. Whether the commercial ban satisfies rational basis review.
1. Arguments
The State’s principle argument is that the district court based its
conclusion on the faulty premise that the legislative objective of the
MMA was to provide access to marijuana to those who need it. The State
asserts that this assumption led the court to conclude that the commercial
prohibition works in opposition to this objective.39 The State takes the
position that the legislative purpose of the MMA was merely to continue
protecting cardholders from prosecution, to provide a limited ability to
cultivate marijuana, and to address the abuses stemming from the prior
version of the law.40 Under these objectives, the State asserts that the
Legislature was well within its discretion to ban commercial sales
because such a ban would not lead to cardholder prosecution, would still
Id. at 19.
Br. of Appellant at 13.
39
Id. at 11.
40
Id.
37
38
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permit limited opportunities to cultivate marijuana, and would address
abuses under the prior law such as the diversion of medical marijuana to
non-cardholders.41
The State further argues that the district court exceeded the scope
of rational basis review by considering the effectiveness of the
commercial ban in meeting these objectives. Under its concept of
rational basis review, the state asserts that, if it had any burden at all, it
was only to roughly estimate that the ban was related to these objectives
at the time the provision was made.42 The State considers evidence of the
law’s effectiveness and of changed circumstances since that time as
beyond the scope of rational basis review.43
MCIA argues that it met its initial burden of showing a
discriminatory effect by demonstrating that the MMA classified people
and the ban treated those classes unequally. MCIA asserts that the MMA
created a class of persons who need marijuana, but lack the ability to
cultivate their own.44 MCIA points to the section of the MMA that
provides “some debilitated persons in need of medical marijuana have
the capability of growing their own—many do not.”45
Having established a classification, MCIA argues that the
commercial ban treats this class of people differently than others
because, under the ban, providers will be unwilling to cultivate marijuana
for them free of charge.46 Thus, MCIA argues that the commercial ban
discriminates against them by making it impossible for them to access
marijuana while giving access to those with means to cultivate it.
MCIA further argues that the State failed to meet its burden of
showing any rational connection between a government objective and the
banning of commercial sales. The State asserts the objective of providing
access to cardholders, but MCIA observes that the commercial ban
clearly has an opposite effect.47 As to the objective of reducing the
abuses, MCIA observes that abuses have in fact decreased since the
passage of the MMA despite the enjoinment of the commercial ban.48
Finally, as to the objective of reducing liability under federal law, MCIA
observes that federal law does not distinguish between commercial and
non-commercial activity and that the US Department of Justice will not
interfere with medical marijuana laws.49 Thus, without any rational
reason to eliminate commercial activity, aside from the state’s

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
44
Appellee’s Response Br. at 14.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 26.
47
Id. at 23.
48
Id. at 4–5.
49
Id. at 34–35.
41
42
43
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speculation that some conceivable justification exists, MCIA concludes
that the statute fails rational basis review.50
2. Analysis
The Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the commercial
ban will depend on how it applies the rational basis test. The State’s
argument that the ban rationally relates to the reduction in abuses is
persuasive if the Court limits its consideration to justifications the
Legislature had in 2011. At that time, the Legislature was genuinely
concerned about the diversion of medical marijuana to non-cardholders.
Banning commercial sales could be rationally tied to prevention of this
abuse because that kind of availability arguable created greater
opportunities for diversion.
However, if the Court requires substantiated evidence of the
legislators actually making that rationalization or if the court permits
evidence of the subsequent effectiveness of the commercial ban in
actually preventing the abuse, then the State’s argument quickly falls
apart. Ultimately, the State offers little concrete evidence in support of its
conclusion that the MMA’s objectives are rationally related to the
commercial ban and does not rebut MCIA’s assertion that abuses have
decreased in spite of the commercial ban’s enjoinment. The State’s
argument depends on the court giving the Legislature the deference that
it believes is necessary under rational basis review. Despite the State’s
lack of evidence, the Court may be persuaded by the idea that if people
are truly discriminated against by the commercial ban, the proper remedy
is to petition the Legislature to amend the law.51
C. Whether the 25 patient review trigger satisfies rational basis review.
1. Arguments
The State’s argument for this provision parallels its position on
commercial prohibition.52 The State attacks the district court’s
consideration of the current circumstances of the law, specifically the
evidence showing that abuses of the certification process by physicians
have reduced despite the provision’s enjoinment.53 Like in its argument
for the commercial ban, the State reasons that such evidence is irrelevant
to rational basis review. Rather, the State insists that the court should
have limited its review to what the Legislature faced in 2011.54
Id. at 4.
Br. of Appellant at 12.
52
Id. at 28.
53
Id.
54
Id.
50
51
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Thus, the State focuses its argument on how the Legislature
created the 25 patient review trigger in response to its understanding of
the abuses occurring under the prior law. The State asserts that in 2011,
the Legislature was concerned about evidence of doctors travelling the
state, or using video conferencing, to certify hundreds of patients without
actually establishing doctor-patient relationships.55 The State also points
to the Legislature’s concern that physicians were not held accountable
for certifications under the vague “chronic pain” category. 56 The State
asserts that these concerns constitute a legitimate state interest in
controlling the certification of cardholders, and it concludes that ensuring
a standard of care by creating an automatic review system for physicians
is rationally related to that interest.57
MCIA argues that evidence of the current circumstances of this
provision show its ineffectiveness and therefore reveals its irrationality.
MCIA points to the fact that the board of medical examiners has reported
no problems with physicians abusing the medical marijuana certification
process since 2011 despite the fact that this provision has never been in
effect.58 MCIA asserts that this evidence demonstrates that the provision
is not necessary to meet its purported objectives and reveals provision’s
irrational nature.59
MCIA further argues that even in 2011, the Legislature lacked
rational basis to impose this provision because by 2010, the Board of
Medical Examiners had sufficient authority to discipline certifying
doctors who violated its standard of care; by that time, the board had also
issued a directive prohibiting certification solely by videoconference.60
MCIA insists that even if the evidence of the provision’s current
irrelevance is not proper, then the evidence that the Board of Medical
Examiners already had abuses under control in 2010 undermines the
Legislature’s rational for making the provision in 2011.
2. Analysis
Like for the commercial prohibition, the Supreme Court’s
decision on this provision will depend greatly on whether it views
evidence of the current effectiveness or necessity of the law as proper in
rational basis review. If so, the State will have to overcome the fact that
complaints about issuance of medical marijuana certifications have dried
up under the current law. The State could argue that the only reason
abuses appear to have receded since 2011 is because the physician
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
Id.
58
Appellee’s Response Br. at 33.
59
Id. at 34.
60
Id. at 32.
55
56
57
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review trigger has been enjoined. However, that would require the State
to bring in its own evidence of the current necessity of the provision,
something that it has declined to do thus far.
However, even if the Court does not view current circumstance
evidence as proper, MCIA still makes a persuasive argument that, in
2011, the Legislature lacked a rational justification for this provision.
The evidence that the Board of Medical Examiners had already taken
steps to curb abuses cuts against the state’s argument that the Legislature
was legitimately concerned about them.
D. The constitutionality of the provider advertising ban.
1. Arguments
The State argues the commercial advertising ban restricts only
commercial speech and, therefore, should be subject to the less rigorous,
four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Comm’n of New York,61 rather than strict scrutiny.62 The State
uses statutory analysis to demonstrate that the provision only implicates
commercial speech,63 asserting that the statute’s restriction to “not
advertise” and its application only to “marijuana or marijuana-related
products” is unambiguously limited to commercial speech.64
The State applies the Hudson factors to the provision and finds
that it passes the constitutional test at the first stage. The State takes the
position that the provider advertisements concern an illegal activity65 and
points out that the first factor requires that the commercial speech at
issue “must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading.”66 Because
the illegal content of the speech is a threshold issue, the State argues that
the court need not address the remaining factors.
Even so, the State runs through the remaining factors to further
demonstrate the constitutionality of the ban. The remaining factors
require that, when “there is a substantial government interest, the
regulation must directly advance the asserted objective, and reach no
further than necessary to accomplish that objective.”67 The State
observes that the Legislature had a substantial government interest in
removing the profit motive of medical marijuana,68 and argues that the
provision directly advances that objective by suppressing advertising and
reducing demand.69 The State concludes that the provision meets the
final tailoring question because there is an “immediate connection”

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Br. of Appellant at 31.
Id. at 33.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 38.
66
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565.
67
Id.
68
Br. of Appellant at 41.
69
Id. at 42.
61
62
63
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between the ends of removing the profit motive and the means of
prohibiting advertising.70
MCIA argues the district court correctly found the ban to be
unconstitutional on the ground that its “overbreadth implicates noncommercial speech, both political and educational, which triggers strict
scrutiny.”71 MCIA argues that the restriction implicates political speech
because medical marijuana is a controversial and politicized topic and
the restriction could be used to infringe on that discourse.72
MCIA further argues that even if the Hudson test applies to the
provision, it is still unconstitutional. MCIA asserts that the State did not
meet its burden of showing a substantial government objective by failing
to offer a witness in support of its position.73 Just for good measure,
MCIA also throws in evidence of the current circumstances of the
provision that show that the MMA has functioned effectively despite the
provision’s enjoinment back in 2011.74
2. Analysis
It is unlikely that the Court will adopt MCIA’s and the district
court’s argument that the provision implicates political speech. The State
makes a persuasive argument that the statute plainly restricts only
advertisements for marijuana products. Considering its unambiguous
language, MCIA’s argument that it may be used for other purposes has
little weight.
Rather, the Court’s decision on the provision may well depend
on whether it considers the provider advertisements to concern a legal or
illegal activity. The arguments of both parties hinge on that issue, but
neither party can point to any precedent from the Court suggesting that it
will go one way or the other. The State’s argument that marijuana is
illegal under both state and federal law is simple, but it may be
persuasive if the Court recognizes that those laws actually affect the
content of the advertisements at issue here.
Conversely, the Court may acknowledge that medical marijuana
is legal in Montana for cardholders, meaning that the provision concerns
only the use and sale of a legal substance. But, the Court has not yet
ruled on whether the MMA actually legalizes medical marijuana in
Montana or whether it merely creates a protection from prosecution for
cardholders. The district court took up that issue below, inferring from
the 2012 supreme court decision that the MMA makes medical marijuana
Id. at 43.
Appellee’s Response Br. at 40.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 41.
74
Id.
70
71
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legal.75 It is noteworthy that the supreme court hinted to medical
marijuana’s legality in its decision despite its parallel acknowledgment
of marijuana’s illegality under federal law. This does not necessarily
mean the Court will follow the district court’s holding on medical
marijuana’s legality, nor does it mean that they will uphold the injunction
on the advertising ban, but they are certain to focus on both issues at oral
argument.
E. Whether the ban on probationer use satisfies rational basis review.
1. Arguments
MCIA argues on cross appeal that it is irrational to create a
blanket rule depriving probationers of medical marijuana and that the
district court’s solution of applying a case-by-case test is not possible
under the provision. MCIA supports its argument of irrationality with the
holding from State v. Nelson76 which requires that medical marijuana be
treated as a prescription drug, not a controlled substance, in the context
of conditions imposed at criminal sentencing. MCIA also points to the
holding from State v. Ashby77 which affirms that, on a case-by-case basis,
sentencing conditions must have a reasonable nexus to the offender’s
underlying offense. Under these holdings, MCIA asserts that the
government has no rational basis to restrict probationer access, so long as
it cannot identify a reasonable relationship between the restriction and
the underlying offense. MCIA concludes that the provision is facially
irrational because its form as a blanket ban precludes any case-by-case
analysis.
The State argues that the ban satisfies rational basis because the
Legislature had a legitimate interest in preventing probationers from
access to marijuana and because the ban is rationally related to that
interest. The State asserts a legislative interest in allowing the
Department of Corrections to establish its own sentencing conditions and
in preventing probationer access because of their high rates of substance
abuse and dependency issues.78 The State also undermines MCIA’s
application of Nelson, arguing that it was based on the prior version of
the law.79
The State agrees with MCIA’s and the district court’s conclusion
that a case-by-case approach to this problem would satisfy the nexus
requirement of Ashby. The State asserts that under the probationer ban,
Order Mot. Summ. J. 8:1–8.
195 P.3d 826, 833 (Mont. 2008).
179 P.3d 1164, 1168 (Mont. 2008).
78
Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 18, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont.
Aug. 3, 2015) (DA 15-0055).
79
Id.
75
76
77
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offenders would still have the opportunity to argue at sentencing for
access to marijuana.80 The State concludes that, because of the
inapplicability of Nelson and the availability of case-by-case
determinations under Ashby, the provisions is rationally related to the
purpose of deferring to the Department of Corrections and reducing
substance abuse among probationer.81
2. Analysis
The Court will likely recognize the State’s asserted purpose in
deferring to the department of corrections but may find that it lacks a
rational relationship to the provision’s blanket effect. MCIA makes a
persuasive argument that while a case-by-case determination would be
rational, the provision does not permit that approach as it is written. The
statute provides that “[a] person may not be a registered cardholder if the
person is in the custody of or under the supervision of the department of
corrections.”82 The State makes no argument as to how the Department
of Corrections could get around that language and allow access to a
probationer under any circumstances, including those where the
probationer has a qualifying medical condition and has not committed
any drug or substance-abuse related offense. Even so, the Court will have
to decide whether this lack of flexibility in the provision makes it facially
irrational, a potentially high bar.
F. The constitutionality of the warrantless search provisions.
1. Arguments
MCIA’s principle argument is that the district court erred in
applying a relaxed federal regulatory inspection standard in Montana
where the Constitution affords additional privacy rights. MCIA asserts
that the district court failed to perform a separate analysis of the
provision, taking into consideration Montana’s constitutional right to
privacy.83 MCIA cites to State v. Bowen,84 in support of this point which
held that such an “independent analysis” is necessary in the case of any
warrantless search.85 MCIA also points to the requirement under the
Constitution’s privacy clause that the State must provide a compelling
reason to invade privacy.86 MCIA asserts that the State failed to show a
compelling reason for the inspection procedure and that the district court
Id.
Id. at 18–19.
82
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–307(4) (2015).
83
Appellee’s Response Br. at 44.
84
755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988).
85
Id. at 1370.
86
Appellee’s Response Br. at 44.
80
81
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erred by not take this failure into consideration in a separate analysis of
Montana privacy rights.
The State argues that the district court was correct to apply the
federal standard for regulatory inspections and that the inspections under
this provision are easily satisfy by that standard. The standard offered by
the state comes from New York v. Burger87 where the United States
Supreme Court held that regulatory inspections of “closely regulated”
industries are an exception to the search warrant requirement. 88 The State
asserts that the district court had every right to apply the precedent of the
United States Supreme Court, especially when it is as closely on point as
Burger.89 Furthermore, the state observes that the plaintiffs do not
contest that growing and providing medical marijuana constitutes a
“closely regulated” activity.90
The State further argues that, even under a separate analysis of
the provision, it would still meet Montana’s heightened privacy standards
because of its reasonable nature. The State asserts that, under State v.
Bassett,91 Montana’s privacy protections are limited by their objective
reasonableness.92 The State reasons that providers choosing to participate
in this industry have the reasonable expectation that inspections will
occur, the expectation stemming from the fact that they went through an
authorization procedure and have been given the opportunity to deal in
an “otherwise illegal substance.”93 The state concludes that this
reasonable expectation of an invasion of privacy makes the invasion
itself reasonable and therefore satisfies Montana’s privacy protection
standards.
The State further concludes that the Legislature had a compelling
interest in conducting the inspections and that the provision is narrowly
tailored to that purpose. The State asserts that the Legislature had a
compelling interest in enforcing criminal laws and, because it had
created a narrow exception to those laws, the Legislature had a
compelling interest in ensuring that providers stay within that
exception.94 The State also asserts that the provision is narrowly tailored
to that interest because the inspections occur during regular business
hours for the limited purpose of ensuring provider compliance with the
MMA.95
2. Analysis
482 U.S. 691(1987).
Id. at 702.
Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 20.
90
Id. at 19.
91
982 P.2d 410 (Mont. 1999).
92
Id.
93
Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 22.
94
Id.
95
Id.
87
88
89
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The Court will likely agree with MCIA’s point that a separate
analysis of the provision is required in light of Montana’s privacy rights.
While Burger provides an effective standard for analyzing search
warrant exceptions for regulatory inspections, the Court cannot ignore
the heightened and separate right to privacy found in Montana.
However, even under that heightened standard, the State does
make a separate and persuasive argument that the provision is
reasonable. Considering the illegality of marijuana in Montana and the
high standard for authorization under the current MMA, the Court will
likely agree that providers have an expectation that inspection is part of
that authorization. The Court will recognize the ease in which providers
can exceed the limitations of their operations, transforming a legal
enterprise into a criminal one with little effort.

